Addendum on Vagueness, Bivalence, and Science

Ilkka Pättiniemi For this week’s installment I will tie up some loose ends from my post on vagueness, as there is always more to say.  Thing the first: bivalence and realism.It seems clear that scientific realism requires bivalence, but does bivalence (or the demand for bivalence) imply (a demand for) realism? Simply put: no. TheContinue reading “Addendum on Vagueness, Bivalence, and Science”

No Escape from Method

Petri Turunen While doing metaphilosophy, one can come across some rather hostile attitudes. This is particularly true if one dares to consider such questions as how is, can, or even should philosophy be practiced. Some say that such methodological considerations are a non-starter since philosophy, by its very nature, should not have any constraints. PhilosophyContinue reading “No Escape from Method”

Does Science Require Metaphysics? – The Case of Vagueness

Ilkka Pättiniemi Some time ago, Ilmari made a general case against the metaphysicians’ claim that science requires metaphysics. I agree with what was said there, but wish to make a more piecemeal case against such claims. To that end, I will look at vagueness, and see whether a metaphysical (or a merely philosophical) solution toContinue reading “Does Science Require Metaphysics? – The Case of Vagueness”

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