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How to Abolish Minds: What Is It Like to Be a Zombie?

Ilkka Pättiniemi Last time around, Thomas Nagel (1974) came to the rescue for the dualist: we after all can know that there are other minds. Notice, however, that the dissolution of skepticism about other minds rests on the notion of similarity between subjects. This similarity has to be physical/behavioral or else risk begging the questionContinue reading “How to Abolish Minds: What Is It Like to Be a Zombie?”

How to Abolish Minds: Feeling Batty

Ilkka Pättiniemi When we last left off solipsism loomed in the horizon for the opponent of materialism. Here I will introduce an argument that might save the dualist/mentalist from such a horrid fate: Thomas Nagel’s famous How is it Like to Be a Bat? (1974).             In his the paper Nagel argues thatContinue reading “How to Abolish Minds: Feeling Batty”

How to Abolish Minds: Implications of Zombies

Ilkka Pättiniemi For this week’s installment (woefully late) I am going to dive into the depths of the philosophy of mind. Namely I will be arguing against minds, at least as they have been conceived by many thinkers in the past. To that effect I will start with philosophical zombies. Zombies were introduced into theContinue reading “How to Abolish Minds: Implications of Zombies”