Consequences of Fallibilism

Ilkka Pättiniemi In my last blog post, I took up the idea that fallibilism should be taken seriously in the philosophy of mathematics. In doing so, I did not mean to imply that philosophers of mathematics (or mathematicians for that matter) deny that we are fallible creatures. Rather, my intent was to state, following Tymoczko,Continue reading “Consequences of Fallibilism”

The Errors of Empiricism: Infallibility of Experience

Ilmari Hirvonen In some sense empiricism is an almost trivially true doctrine: in order to find out what the empirical world is like, some sort of empirical research is needed. And precisely in this sense empiricism is an integral part of current – and past – science.  But in philosophy empiricism has had different, moreContinue reading “The Errors of Empiricism: Infallibility of Experience”

How to Test a (Metaphysical) Theory?

Ilmari Hirvonen Take any theory, model, or claim that is about something. Now, it seems rather obvious that there is a distinction to be made between what is true according to the theory and whether the theory itself is true. In order to make this clearer, consider Newton’s second law: F = ma. By substitutingContinue reading “How to Test a (Metaphysical) Theory?”

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